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The widening inequality in income distribution in recent years, and the associated excessive pay
packages of CEOs in the U.S. and elsewhere, is of growing concern among policy makers as well as
the common person. However, there seems to be no satisfactory answer, in conventional economic
theories and models, to the fundamental question of what kind of pay distribution we ought to see,
at least under ideal conditions, in a free market environment and whether this distribution is fair.
We propose a game theoretic framework that addresses these questions and show that the lognor-
mal distribution is the fairest inequality of pay in an organization comprising of homogenous agents,
achieved at equilibrium, under ideal free market conditions. We also show that for a population
of two different classes of agents, the final distribution is a combination of two different lognormal
distributions where one of them, corresponding to the top ∼3-5% of the population, can be misiden-
tified as a Pareto distribution. Our theory also shows the deep and direct connection between
potential game theory and statistical mechanics through entropy, which is a measure of fairness in a
distribution. This leads us to propose the fair market hypothesis, that the self-organizing dynamics
of the ideal free market, i.e., Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”, not only promotes efficiency but also
maximizes fairness under the given constraints.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been growing concern over
the widening inequalities in income and wealth distri-
butions in the U.S. and elsewhere [1–3]. The statistics
are troubling – for instance, as of 2010, the top 1% of
households in the U.S. owned 35.4% of all privately held
wealth [4], and it had risen from a low of about 20% in
1976.
An important source of the wealth inequality is a sim-
ilar trend in the income and pay or wage distributions.
Income remains highly concentrated, with the top 1% of
income earners received 17.2% of all income in 2009, and
that’s up from 12.8% in 1982 [4, 5]. A related trend
of equally great concern is the runaway pay packages
for CEOs which are reflected in the extraordinarily high
CEO pay ratios in the U.S. [6, 7]. There is much dis-
cussion both in academic literature and popular press
about what all these mean, what the consequences are,
and what can or should be done about it [8–12].
Obviously, before any policy actions, if any, are taken
to address these challenges, we need to understand more
deeply why and how such inequalities occur. Since dif-
ferent people have different abilities and therefore make
different contributions, we do expect to see unequal dis-
tributions in income and wealth. So, a certain level of
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inequality is to be expected. But, at the risk of sounding
oxymoronic, what is the fairest inequality? In particular,
in an ideal free market environment , what is the inequal-
ity we ought to see? While there is extensive empirical
literature on income and wealth distributions, and we cite
only a sample here [6, 8, 9, 13–16], there is no satisfac-
tory answer to such questions in conventional economic
theories [17]. Instead of just relying on empirical data
alone, can we predict, at least under ideal conditions,
what to expect from a theoretical analysis? Two funda-
mental questions one would like answered are: What kind
of pay distribution will arise, under ideal conditions, in a
free market environment comprising of utility maximizing
employees and profit maximizing companies? Is this dis-
tribution fair? The answers to these questions can serve
as a fundamental benchmark against which we can eval-
uate the distributions seen in real life. This reference can
help us measure and understand the deviations caused by
non-idealities under actual conditions, and to develop ap-
propriate policy frameworks and incentive structures to
try to correct the inequalities. It can give us a quantita-
tive basis for understanding and developing pay packages
for executives, tax policies, etc.
In the past decade or so, there has been much work in
the econophysics community to model income and wealth
distributions by applying concepts and techniques from
statistical mechanics [16–31]. While these models are
quite interesting and instructive, they haven’t, however,
bridged the rather wide conceptual gulf that exists be-
tween economics and econophysics [32, 33], particularly
in two crucial areas. One, the typical particle model of
agent behavior in econophysics assumes agents to have
nearly “zero intelligence”, acting at random, with no in-
2tent or purpose. This does not sit well with an extensive
body of economic literature spanning several decades,
where one models, in the ideal case, a perfectly ratio-
nal agent whose goal is to maximize its utility or profit
by acting strategically, not randomly. From the perspec-
tive of an economist, it is quite reasonable to ask “How
can theories and models based on the collective behavior
of purpose-free, random, molecules explain the collective
behavior of goal-driven, optimizing, strategizing men and
women?”
Another conceptual stumbling block is the role of en-
tropy in economics. In statistical thermodynamics, equi-
librium is reached when entropy, which is a measure
of randomness or uncertainty, is maximized. So, an
economist wonders, why would maximizing randomness
or uncertainty be helpful in economic systems? We all
know that markets are stable, and function well, when
things are orderly, with less uncertainty, not more. As
Amartya Sen observed [34], “Given the association of
doom with entropy in the context of thermodynamics
it may take a little time to get used to entropy as a good
thing (‘How grand, entropy is on the increase!’), . . . ”
Similar objections were raised by Paul Samuelson [35]:
“As will become apparent, I have limited tolerance for
the perpetual attempts to fabricate for economics con-
cepts of ‘entropy’ imported from the physical sciences
or constructed by analogy to Clausius-Boltzmann mag-
nitudes.” Thus, we run into major conceptual hurdles
in the typical statistical mechanics-based approaches to
problems in economics, particularly in the study of pay,
income and wealth distributions.
Besides these conceptual challenges, there is also a
technical one due to the nature of the datasets in eco-
nomics. As Ormerod [33] and Perline [36] discuss, one
can easily misinterpret data from lognormal distribu-
tions, particularly from truncated datasets, as inverse
power law or other distributions. Therefore, empirical
verification of econophysics models is still in the early
stages.
Addressing one of the two conceptual challenges,
Venkatasubramanian proposed an information-theoretic
framework [37, 38] wherein he identified that entropy re-
ally is a measure of fairness in a distribution, not just
randomness or uncertainty, which then makes it an ap-
propriate candidate in economics. In this paper, we fol-
low up on this line of enquiry and address the other crit-
ical challenge of reconciling the behavior of goal-driven,
teleological, agents with that of purpose-free, randomly
driven molecules. We start from a familiar ground in eco-
nomics, namely, game theory, to develop a new concep-
tual framework to address the pay distribution questions
we raised above. This leads to surprising and useful in-
sights about a deep connection between game theory and
statistical mechanics, paving the way for a general theo-
retical framework that unifies the dynamics of purposeful
animate agents with that of purpose-free inanimate ones.
II. PAY DISTRIBUTION IN AN IDEAL FREE
MARKET ENVIRONMENT: FORMULATING
THE PROBLEM
We follow Venkatasubramanian’s [38] approach in for-
mulating the problem and restate it here for the conve-
nience of the reader. Consider a competitive, dynamic,
free market environment comprising of a large number
of utility maximizing rational agents as employees and
profit maximizing rational agents as corporations. We
assume an ideal environment where the market is per-
fectly competitive, transaction costs are negligible, and
no externalities are present. In this ideal free market,
employees are free to switch jobs and move between com-
panies in search of better utilities. Similarly, companies
are free to fire and hire employees in order to maximize
their profits. We do not consider the effect of taxes.
We also assume that a company needs to retain all its
employees in order to survive in this competitive market
environment. Thus, a company will take whatever steps
necessary, allowed by its constraints, to retain all its em-
ployees. Similarly, all employees need a utility to survive
and that they will do whatever is necessary, allowed by
certain norms, to stay employed. We assume that nei-
ther the companies nor the employees engage in illegal
practices such as fraud, collusion, and so on.
In this ideal free market, consider a company A with
N employees and a salary budget of M , with an average
salary of Save = M/N . Let us assume that there are n
categories of employees – ranging from secretaries to the
CEO, contributing in different ways towards the com-
pany’s overall success and value creation. All employees
in category i contribute value Vi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, such
that V1 < V2 < · · · < Vn. Let the corresponding value
at Save be Vave, occurring at category s. Since all em-
ployees are contributing unequally, some more some less,
they all need to be compensated differently, commensu-
rate with their relative contributions towards the overall
value created by the company. Instead, A has an egali-
tarian policy that all employees are equal and therefore
pays all of them the same salary, Save, irrespective of
their contributions. The salary of the CEO is the same
as that of an administrative assistant in the mail room.
This salary distribution is a sharp vertical line at Save,
as seen in figure 1(a), a Kronecker delta function. As
noted, while this may seem fair in a social or moral jus-
tice sense, clearly it is not in an economic sense. If this
were to be the only company in the economic system, or
if A is completely isolated from other companies in the
economic environment, the employees will be forced to
continue to work under these conditions as there is no
other choice.
However, in an ideal free market system there are other
choices. Therefore, all those employees who contribute
more than the average – i.e., those in value categories
Vi such that Vi > Vave (e.g., senior engineers, vice pres-
idents, CEO), who feel that their contributions are not
fairly valued and compensated for by A, will therefore be
3motivated to leave for other companies where they are
offered higher salaries. Hence, in order to survive A will
be forced to match the salaries offered by others to re-
tain these employees, thereby forcing the distribution to
spread to the right of Save, as seen in figure 1(b).
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FIG. 1. Spreading of the salary distribution under competi-
tion in a free market environment
At the same time, the generous compensation paid to
all employees in categories Vi such that Vi < Vave, will
motivate candidates with the relevant skill sets (e.g., low-
level administration, sales and marketing staff) from
other companies to compete for these higher paying po-
sitions in A. This competition will eventually drive the
compensation down for these overpaid employees forcing
the distribution to spread to the left of Save, as seen in
Figure 1(c). Eventually, we will have a distribution that
is not a delta function, but a broader one where different
employees earn different salaries depending on the values
of their contributions. The funds for the higher salaries
now paid to the formerly underpaid employees (i.e., those
who satisfy Vi > Vave) come out of the savings resulting
from the reduced salaries of the formerly overpaid group
(i.e., those who satisfy Vi < Vave), thereby conserving the
total salary budget M .
Thus, we see that concerns about fairness in pay cause
the emergence of a more equitable salary distribution in
a free market environment through its self-organizing,
adaptive, evolutionary dynamics and that its spread is
closely related to fairness in relative compensation. The
point of this analysis is not to model the exact details
of the free market dynamics but to show that the notion
of fairness plays a central role in driving the emergence
and spread of the salary (in general, utility) distribution
through the free market mechanisms.
Even though an individual employee cares only about
her utility and no one else’s, the collective actions of all
the employees, combined with the profit maximizing sur-
vival actions of all the companies, in an ideal free market
environment of supply and demand for talent, under re-
source constraints, lead towards a more fair allocation
of wages, guided by Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” of
self-organization.
We have used salary as a proxy for utility in this ex-
ample to motivate the problem. In general, utility for
an employee is a complicated aggregate that depends
on a host of factors, some measurable, some not. Obvi-
ously, pay (i.e., total compensation including base salary,
bonus, options etc.) is an important component of the
utility. Other components include, quantity and quality
of the work or effort, authority and power of the position,
job security, competition, career and personal growth op-
portunities, work schedule, retirement and health bene-
fits, peer appreciation and recognition, company culture
and work environment, job location, and so on, not nec-
essarily in that order.
Given this free market dynamics scenario, three im-
portant questions arise: (i) Will this self-organizing dy-
namics lead to an equilibrium distribution or will the dis-
tribution continually evolve without ever settling down?
(ii) If there exists an equilibrium distribution, what is it?
(iii) Is this distribution fair?
Our knowledge of the free market dynamics is incom-
plete, in an important way, without an answer to these
fundamental questions. This requires a theoretical un-
derstanding of the free market dynamics, at a reasonable
level of depth and detail, particularly from the bottom
up, agents-based, perspective as described above. Given
the obvious complexity of this dynamics, it is unrealistic
to expect to develop a theory, and the associated mod-
els, that will address all the details and nuances. There-
fore, our goal is to develop a theoretical, quantitative,
framework that identifies the key concepts and general
principles, helps us model and analyze free market dy-
namics under ideal conditions, and address these central
questions. We propose such a framework in the following
sections.
III. A GAME THEORETIC FRAMEWORK:
“RESTLESS” AGENTS MODEL
A. Formulating the payoff function
We believe these questions can be addressed using a po-
tential game theoretic framework. Continuing with the
scenario described above, we assume that all employee
agents are generally “dissatisfied” in their current po-
sitions, due to aforementioned unfairness considerations.
In our model, every employee feels that she is unfairly un-
dervalued compared to others in their peer group. Every
employee feels they could be doing better, they should be
doing better, given their talents and experience, in their
company or elsewhere. As a result, they all are constantly
on the lookout for job opportunities to improve their util-
ities. That is, these utility-maximizing, fairness-seeking,
teleological agents are always restless, itching to move.
Even though the utility for an employee is a complex
aggregate of several factors, we propose that it is broadly
composed of three dominant elements: (i) utility derived
from salary, (ii) disutility from effort, and (iii) utility
from fairness. The first two are rather straightforward
to see, but the third requires some more discussion along
the lines of the scenario described above. The first two
help us model the tendency of an employee to maximize
one’s utility from salary while minimizing the effort put
into receiving it.
4As for the third, consider the following. At any job
level, an agent is looking to improve her utility only in
the jobs space that is accessible to her based on her ed-
ucation, experience, and other such qualifications. That
is, a receptionist is not eyeing the job announcement for
a CEO. In that sense, what matters in trying to improve
one’s utility is the local competition at the agent’s level.
It is the assessment of one’s relative status in a peer group
that matters, not its absolute value. For instance, a vice
president is not necessarily very happy that she is en-
joying much more utility than her receptionist, but is
extremely unhappy that her peer, another vice president
with comparable (or perhaps even less) skills and contri-
butions, has been better recognized in the organization
with awards, better work assignments, more perks etc.,
thereby enjoying a higher utility than her. As far as this
“unhappy” agent is concerned, the metric that matters
to her is whether she is one of the chosen few or one of
the many in her peer level. Her preference is to be one
of the few and possibly the only one enjoying a lot of
utility. This is irrespective of the category one is in. The
question is not about money, but about a fair valuation
and recognition of one’s abilities and contributions to the
organization. Thus, it is a fairness issue and it matters a
lot to people. This is what we attempt to capture in our
formulation.
Combining all three, we have
hi(Si, Ei, Ni) = u(Si)− v(Ei) + f(Ni), (1)
where hi is the total utility of an employee earning a
salary Si by expending an effort Ei, while competing
with (Ni − 1) other agents in the same job category i
for a fair recognition of one’s contributions. u(·) is the
utility derived from salary, v(·) the disutility from effort,
and f(·) is the utility from fairness that depends only on
the number of agents in any given category i. We propose
the following functional forms for these three elements:
u(Si) = α lnSi (2)
v(Ei) = β(lnSi)
2 (3)
f(Ni) = −γ lnNi, (4)
where α, β, γ > 0. The first one is easy to see, it is
the commonly used logarithmic utility function. As for
the second, the effort, and hence the disutility, associ-
ated with a new job are hard to calculate accurately as
there are many uncertainties such as the kind of work,
work hours, office politics, company culture, relocation
anxieties, and so on, which are often difficult, if not im-
possible, to quantify in real life. In addition, the effort
term not only captures the quantity and quality of work
involved, but also the necessary qualifications such as ed-
ucation, skills, experience, etc., needed at the job. For
example, someone with no medical training, obviously,
will not be able to perform the work of a cardiac surgeon
successfully, no matter how hard he or she tries. Typi-
cally, one estimates and compensates for this disutility of
effort by negotiating a salary package that would make it
worth the effort. Thus, in practice, one intuitively uses
salary as a proxy to estimate the effort and compensate
for the disutility.
We find empirical evidence that supports this line of
reasoning in the work of Stratton [39] and Ahituv and
Lerman [40] who have demonstrated that effort correlates
with log(salary). Furthermore, our model is consistent
with the conditions imposed on effort E as a function
of salary, E(S). According to Katz [41] and Akerlof and
Yellen [42], E(S) should satisfy the following conditions:
(i) dE/dS > 0
(ii) E(0) ≤ 0 and
(iii) the elasticity S/E× (dE/dS) should be decreasing.
Our effort function E(S) = lnS satisfies all three condi-
tions:
(i) dE/dS = 1/S > 0
(ii) E(0) = −∞ < 0
(iii) S/E × (dE/dS) = (S/ lnS) × (1/S) = 1/ lnS is
decreasing.
Therefore, our formulation for effort as a function of
salary, disutility as a quadratic function of effort fol-
lowing [43–48], and hence v = β(lnS)2 is an eminently
reasonable formulation supported both by empirical evi-
dence as well as by theoretical expectations.
For the utility derived from fairness, we believe the
negative logarithmic form captures the agents’ prefer-
ences and behavior correctly as explained below. Since
Ni ∈ [0,∞], fi is [∞,−∞]. This payoff function may be
intuitively interpreted as capturing the following:
(i) When Ni → ∞, fi → −∞, i.e., an agent in level
i feels “unfairly” treated, undervalued and under-
recognized as there are so many other agents at the
same job category, thereby reducing her utility.
(ii) When Ni = 0, fi = ∞. This is the state where the
agent can be potentially the “happiest”, most val-
ued and appreciated, the state all the agents strive
for. But since this is an elusive state (for when the
agent arrives at this level, Ni is no longer 0 but 1,
and fi = 0 and not ∞), the agents are constantly
in motion, restless, chasing after this dream of the
“perfect” job. While this is clearly a simplification
of what really happens in the market place, we be-
lieve, this stylized model nevertheless captures an
essential, and dominating, aspect of the dynami-
cal behavior of fairness-seeking, utility-maximizing,
teleological agents, namely, restlessness, that most
employees feel in the real world.
In general, α, β and γ, which model the relative impor-
tance an agent assigns to these three elements, can vary
from agent to agent. However, for the sake of simplicity,
we assume that all agents have the same preferences and
5hence treat these as constant parameters (However, see
section IIID 2 – A Bi-population Game – for a special
case). Further, presumably, there are other expressions
one could use to model these three elements, but the
choices we have made have interesting properties, reveal-
ing important insights and connections as we shall see
shortly.
In order to move to a job with better utility, an agent
needs job offers. So, the employee agents constantly
gather information and scout the market, and their own
companies, for job openings that are commensurate with
their skill sets, experiences and career and personal goals.
Similarly, the company agents (through their human re-
sources department, for example) also conduct similar
searches looking for opportunities to fire and hire em-
ployees so that their profits may be improved.
At any given time, an employee agent is faced with one
of five job options: (i) no new job offer is available, (ii)
new offer has the same utility as the current one, (iii)
new offer has less utility than the current one, (iv) new
offer has more utility, or (v) is let go from the current job
(i.e., zero utility). The agent’s best strategies for the five
options are: for (i), (ii) and (iii), the agent stays put in
the current position at the current utility, for (iv) accept
the new offer, and (v) leave the company and look for
a new position. Each agent’s strategy is independent of
what the other agents are doing.
We are now ready to answer the first question.
B. Is there an equilibrium distribution?
In a potential game framework, payoff is the gradient
of potential φ(x), i.e.,
hi(x) ≡ ∂φ(x)/∂xi, (5)
where xi = Ni/N and x is the population vector. There-
fore, by integration (we replace partial derivative with
total derivative because hi(x) can be reduced to hi(xi)
expressed in Equations (1)-(4)),
φ(x) =
∑n
i=1
∫
hi(x)dxi, (6)
we obtain the potential of the game:
φ(x) = φu + φv + φf + constant, (7)
where
φu = α
∑n
i=1 xi lnSi (8)
φv = −β
∑n
i=1 xi(lnSi)
2 (9)
φf =
γ
N ln
N !∏
n
j=1
(Nxi)!
. (10)
We can show that φ(x) is strictly concave:
∂2φ(x)/∂x2i = −γ/xi < 0. (11)
Therefore, a unique Nash Equilibrium for this game ex-
ists, where φ(x) is maximized, as per the well-known the-
orem [49, p. 60].
It is important to note that this is a stable equilibrium
as long as the evolutionary dynamics satisfies positive
correlation (e.g., replicator dynamics, Smith dynamics,
best response dynamics, etc.), for the potential is a Lya-
punov function under such condition, with a guarantee
of global convergence [49, p. 223].
This answers our first question.
C. Connection with statistical mechanics
Readers familiar with statistical mechanics will recog-
nize the potential component φf as entropy, and that
maximizing the payoff potential in game theoretic equi-
librium would correspond to maximizing entropy in sta-
tistical mechanical equilibrium, revealing a deep and use-
ful connection between these seemingly different concep-
tual frameworks. This connection suggests that one may
view the statistical mechanics approach to molecular be-
havior, also called statistical thermodynamics, from a po-
tential game perspective. In this approach, one may view
the molecules as restless agents in a game (let’s call it the
thermodynamic game), continually jumping from one en-
ergy state to another through intermolecular collisions.
However, unlike employees who are continually driven
to switch jobs in search of better utilities they desire,
molecules are not teleological, i.e., not goal-driven, in
their constant search. As prisoners of Newton’s Laws,
constantly subjected to intermolecular collisions, their
search and dynamical evolution is the result of thermal
agitation.
D. What is the equilibrium distribution?
This connection to statistical thermodynamics, and
the insight that φf is entropy in this context, helps us
in answering the second question: What is the equilib-
rium distribution?
We first answer this question for the thermodynamic
game. Approaching the thermodynamic game from po-
tential game perspective, we have the following “utility”
for molecules in state i:
hi(Ei, Ni) = −βEi − lnNi, (12)
where Ei is the energy of a molecule in state i, β = 1/kT ,
k = 1.3806488× 10−23 JK−1 is Boltzmann constant; and
T is temperature. By integrating the utility, we can ob-
tain the potential of the thermodynamic game:
φ(x) = − β
N
E +
1
N
ln
N !∏n
i=1(Nxi)!
, (13)
where E = N
∑n
i=1 xiEi is the total energy that is con-
served.
We use the method of Lagrange multipliers with L as
the Lagrangian and λ as the Lagrange multiplier for the
6constraint
∑n
i=1 xi = 1:
L = φ+ λ(1 −
n∑
i=1
xi). (14)
Solving ∂L/∂xi = 0 and substituting the results back to∑n
i=1 xi = 1, we obtain the well-known Gibbs-Boltzmann
exponential distribution at equilibrium:
xi =
exp(−βEi)∑n
j=1 exp(−βEj)
. (15)
What we just now did is the standard procedure followed
in maximum entropy methods in statistical mechanics
and information theory to identify the distribution that
maximizes entropy under the given constraints [50–52].
Once again, readers familiar with statistical thermody-
namics will recognize that from (13), we have:
φ = − 1
NkT
(E − TS) = − β
N
A, (16)
where A is the Helmholtz free energy, S is entropy, and
T is temperature.
For the teleodynamic game, i.e., the pay distribution
game, we carry out the same procedure to maximize φ(x)
in Equations (7)-(10) to obtain the following lognormal
distribution at equilibrium:
xi =
1
SiZ
exp

−
(
lnSi − α+γ2β
)2
γ/β

 , (17)
where Z = N exp
[
λ/γ − (α+ γ)2/4βγ] and λ is the La-
grange multiplier.
1. Replicator Dynamics
Alternatively, we can approach this question from the
replicator dynamics point of view in game theory [49]. In
this approach, an agent revises its strategy based on
ρij ∝ xj [hj − hi]+. (18)
Under this protocol, an agent in the job category i who
receives a revision opportunity, i.e., a new job offer in cat-
egory j, switches from i to j with probability ρij . There-
fore the dynamics becomes:
x˙i ∝ xi(hi −
∑n
j=1 xjhj). (19)
The equilibrium is reached (i.e., x˙ = 0) when individual
payoff equals the average payoff of the system:
h∗i =
n∑
j=1
xjh
∗
j = h
∗. (20)
We ignore the trivial solution of xi = 0. Substituting this
equation back in our utility function (Equation (1)), we
solve to find the equilibrium distribution to be
xi =
1
SiZ
exp

−
(
lnSi − α+γ2β
)2
γ/β

 , (21)
where Z = N exp
[
h∗/γ − (α+ γ)2/4βγ]. This result
agrees with (17).
This result is also in agreement with what Venkatasub-
ramanian [37, 38] derived using an information theoretic
framework. In that approach, the constraints are deter-
mined by information typically known about the distri-
bution a priori. They are: (i) total number of employees
N , (ii) total amount of money M budgeted to pay all
these employees, (iii) minimum salary, Smin, received by
the lowest paid employee, often fixed by the minimum
wage law or a reservation wage, and (iv) the maximum
salary, Smax, cannot exceed M . As Venkatasubramanian
has shown, maximizing entropy under these constraints
leads to a lognormal distribution at equilibrium given by:
f(S;µ, σ) =
1
Sσ
√
2pi
exp
[
− (lnS − µ)
2
2σ2
]
, (22)
where µ = ln(M/N); σ = (lnM − lnSmin)/2a; and a is a
parameter chosen using the Chebychev inequality given
by:
Prob(−aσ < X − µ < aσ) ≥ 1− 1
a2
, (23)
to the level of confidence desired in the estimate for σ
(e.g. for a = 10, P ≥ 0.99). Equation (22) is same as (17)
or (21) with the following identities:

µ = α+γ2β
σ =
(
γ
2β
)1/2 . (24)
For the thermodynamic game, it is easy to show
from Equations (18) through (20), and (12), a similar
replicator dynamics analysis produces the same Gibbs-
Boltzmann exponential distribution in (15) at equilib-
rium.
Thus, we see that, intuitively, maximizing the game
theoretic potential (Equation (7) or (13)) is the same as
maximizing entropy subject to the constraints. In the
statistical mechanical or information theoretic formula-
tions, these constraints are separately imposed on en-
tropy whereas in the game theoretic formulation (Equa-
tion (7) or (13)) the constraints are already embedded in
the equation (the only additional constraint imposed is
the total number of agents, N). Therefore, the result-
ing Lagrangian (e.g., Equation (14)) is the same, thereby
leading to the same distribution. These demonstrate
the internal consistency among the three different ap-
proaches, namely, potential game theory, replicator dy-
namics, and statistical mechanics, which is reassuring.
72. A Bi-population Game
A system with indistinguishable and identical agents
is a simplification, of course, of reality and the lognormal
distribution represents the intrinsic inequality for such an
ideal scenario. There are other factors that could further
skew this inequality. One such factor is the heterogeneity
among agents, i.e., different agents having different α, β,
and γ values. As an illustrative example, we present an
analysis for a bi-population system containing two classes
of agents each with a distinct set of α, β, and γ values.
The utility of an agent at salary level i is therefore defined
as
hi,j = αj lnSi − βj(lnSi)2 − γj ln(Ni,1 +Ni,2), (25)
where the choice of j ∈ {1, 2} indicates either Class 1
population or Class 2 population.
The equilibrium replicator dynamics is also modified:{
h∗i,j = h
∗
j ∀i ∈ Ωj
hk,j < h
∗
j ∀k /∈ Ωj ,
(26)
where Ωj = {k|x∗k,j > 0} denotes the collection of levels
with class j’s presence. The first condition is identical
to the homogeneous scenario. The second indicates the
possibility that some levels are only occupied by a single
class (i.e., the utility is too low for the other class).
We can prove that Ω1 ∪ Ω2 = {k|1 ≤ k ≤ n} and
Ω1 ∩ Ω2 = ∅, i.e., every salary level contains some pop-
ulation but not both. First, suppose there are empty
salary levels. They will soon be occupied because of
the infinitely high utilities. Thus Ω1 and Ω2 cover the
whole domain. Second, suppose there is an overlap where
Ωˆ = Ω1 ∩ Ω2. Let the equilibrium population density be
x∗. Equation (26) can be rewritten as:
h∗j = αj lnSi − βj(lnSi)2 − γj lnNx∗ ∀i ∈ Ωˆ. (27)
Thus
lim
∆S→0
∆x∗
∆Si
=
dx∗
dS
=
αj − 2βj lnS
γjS
x∗. (28)
This indicates two distinct gradients for every point in
Ωˆ. Therefore we will not see an overlapping region with
mixed populations.
We can also prove that the equilibrium density curve is
continuous at the interface of two populations. Suppose
otherwise, at the interface S = Sˆ,
x∗1(Sˆ) 6= x∗2(Sˆ) (29)
according to Equation (26) again,
αj ln Sˆ − βj(ln Sˆ)2 − γj lnx∗j
≥αj ln Sˆ − βj(ln Sˆ)2 − γj lnx∗−j
, (30)
i.e.,
x∗j ≥ x∗−j . (31)
The only possible solution is x∗1 = x
∗
2 therefore the pop-
ulation density is continuous at the interface.
Even though we now know these equilibrium charac-
teristics of a bi-population game, an exact equilibrium
density is still tedious to obtain unless Ω1 and Ω2 are
given:
xi =
N1/N
SiZ1
exp

−
(
lnSi − α1+γ1β1
)2
γ1/β1

1(i ∈ Ω1)
+
N2/N
SiZ2
exp

−
(
lnSi − α2+γ2β2
)2
γ2/β2

1(i ∈ Ω2)
(32)
where Zj is the normalization that ensures
∑n
i=1 xi = 1.
We can, however, get a good approximation when the
two lognormal curves of Class 1 and Class 2 are suffi-
ciently separated such that the overlap is insignificant.
The overall distribution is then estimated as a mixture
of two lognormal distributions:
xi ≈ N1
SiZ
exp

−
(
lnSi − α1+γ1β1
)2
γ1/β1


+
N2
SiZ
exp

−
(
lnSi − α2+γ2β2
)2
γ2/β2


(33)
where Nj denotes the number of class j agents and Z de-
notes the normalization parameter which is easily com-
puted.
To test the model predictions, we ran an agent-
based simulation comprising of one million agents in
two classes, at 100 salary levels, with a minimum pay
of $20,000 (using a minimum wage of $10/hr and 2000
hours/year) and a maximum pay of $3,000,000. We ex-
plored the typical case of 95% of the population in Class
1 and 5% in Class 2. The respective α, β, and γ values
for the two classes are shown below. The dynamics un-
folds by having each agent trying to maximize its utility
(given by Equations (1) to (4)) by switching from its cur-
rent job to a better one and the equilibrium (stationary)
distribution emerges over time, as shown in figure 2.
j αj βj γj
1 215 20.5 5
2 220.5 19.45 10
In the figure 2, the blue (Class 1) and yellow (Class
2) histogram bars are data from the simulation and the
lines are predictions by the model. As the results show,
the two populations are sufficiently separated and hence
the individual lognormal distributions predicted by the
model (Equation (33)) fit the data very well. For the
population shown in yellow (Class 2), its higher α, lower
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β, and higher γ make the utilities from salary and fair-
ness components high enough to more than compensate
for the disutility from effort, that the agents from this
population are strongly motivated to jobs with higher
salaries. They are also averse to jobs with lower pay. It
is the opposite for the agents from population 1. Recall
that by effort we don’t mean just the effort expended in
carrying out a job, but we also include all the effort one
has invested over the years in acquiring the necessary ed-
ucation, skills and experience to be able to perform the
job. For the agents from the yellow population (Class
2), given their α, β, and γ values, it’s worth their ef-
fort and thus they end up occupying these higher paying
jobs. We observe that the combined distribution (solid
red line), as one might expect, fits the lognormal distri-
bution for the blue population (Class 1) quite well in the
lower and medium salary ranges but deviates from it for
higher salaries.
We also show that the distribution of the higher
salaries (largely occupied by the yellow population
agents) can be fitted to an inverse power law, given as
follows:
xi ∝ S−(1+η)i (34)
(i) Top 3% fitted: η = 1.60, r2 = 0.99
(ii) Top 5% fitted: η = 1.70, r2 = 0.96
9We see that the inverse power law fit is very good for
both top 3% and 5%. The Pareto exponents from our
simulation data agree quite well with empirical data re-
ported in the literature – between 1 and 2, but typically
around 1.5 for the top 3% [17]. Thus, the main lesson
here is that while the overall distribution is a combina-
tion of two lognormal distributions, it can be quite easily
misidentified as a lognormal for the majority and an in-
verse power law or Pareto distribution for the minority
at the top end of the salaries. This again confirms simi-
lar warnings by Perline [36] and Mitzenmacher [53]. For
actual salary distributions reported in the literature [17],
the available data is not good enough to sort this out
clearly and further studies are needed. Our 2-class ap-
proach can be generalized for the n-class game along the
lines we described above. However, in practice, we sus-
pect that we might only need four classes – low income
(“blue collar” jobs), middle income (mid-level “white col-
lar” jobs), upper income (upper management jobs) and
extreme income (c-suite executives) – to model income
distribution data adequately. At any rate, at the present
time, the empirical data reported in the literature is not
good enough to test 3-class or 4-class models. The best
it seems to be able to do is to identify the need for a
2-class model, but even there it is unable to discriminate
between a lognormal distribution and a power law fit for
the top 3-5% as we showed above.
An interesting question one might ask is “Why does
the 2-class split in actual data occur at about 95-97% of
the population? Why not at 80%, for instance?” In our
theory, this is related to the fraction of the population
that is highly motivated, talented, and driven towards
individual accomplishments and success (i.e., Class 2).
It would be nice if we had data that directly showed
where this 2-class split occurs in the real world, but we
dont. One approximation we can perhaps use on how
human abilities are distributed in a population is how IQ
is distributed in a population. Obviously, as we all know,
IQ doesnt capture the complete picture of the human
talent spectrum and how people succeed. Nevertheless, it
is interesting to note that 2-σ deviation (IQ = ∼130) from
the median IQ value occurs at ∼97% of the population
– i.e., the top ∼3% of the population have an IQ greater
than ∼130, beyond the 2-σ deviation.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
There has been some work in the past that explored
the connection between game theory and statistical me-
chanics [54–56]. What is new about our contribution is
that it shows a direct and deep connection between the
dynamics of animate, fairness-driven, utility-maximizing,
rational teleological agents and inanimate, purpose-free,
thermally-driven molecular entities. Our result reveals
the surprising and important connection between entropy
and game theoretic potential, demonstrating that the sta-
tistical thermodynamic equilibrium reached by molecules
is really a Nash Equilibrium. We believe that this is a
significant insight, for it suggests that statistical thermo-
dynamics can be seen as a special case of potential game
theory. Alternatively, one may view this insight as the
generalization of the laws of statistical thermodynamics
to teleological systems, such as economic systems, yield-
ing a new conceptual framework, which we call statisti-
cal teleodynamics, that unifies statistical thermodynam-
ics and population game theory. This framework bridges
the conceptual gulf mentioned in the introduction, as
our ideal teleological agents are rational, fairness-seeking,
utility maximizing strategists, with a natural connection
to statistical thermodynamics.
As noted, one could presumably choose other expres-
sions to model the three elements (Equations (2)-(4))
in (1), but it is not clear whether they will necessar-
ily lead to the Gibbs-Boltzmann distribution, Helmholtz
free energy and entropy in the limiting case of the ther-
modynamic game involving molecules. We find this cor-
respondence to be particularly appealing, in fact com-
forting, that statistical teleodynamics properly reduces
to well-known results in statistical thermodynamics as a
limiting case. This universality has a nice ring to it.
Another important observation is that, in statistical
thermodynamics, the claim about the equilibrium state
is a probabilistic one – it is themost probable outcome, one
where entropy is maximum. However, our game theoretic
result shows that the Nash Equilibrium state reached by
the molecules, the one that maximizes the potential φ(x),
is a deterministic outcome, not a probabilistic one. This
observation has potentially important implications con-
cerning the philosophical foundations of statistical ther-
modynamics, and that of information theory, such as er-
godicity and metric transitivity [50, 51, 57–62], but we
are not addressing them here.
As we have shown, the deep connection between game
theory and statistical mechanics, and with information
theory, occurs via entropy, a concept that is often mis-
understood and much maligned [34, 35, 37, 38]. In the
past, there have been several attempts to find a suit-
able interpretation of entropy for economic systems with-
out much success [35, 63–65]. In these attempts, one
typically wrote down equations in economics that mim-
icked expressions in thermodynamics for entropy, energy,
temperature, etc. – but no identification of entropy in
terms of meaningful economic concepts was made. Just
as entropy is a measure of disorder in thermodynamics
and uncertainty in information theory, what does en-
tropy mean in economics? Neither interpretation, dis-
order nor uncertainty, makes much sense in the economic
context. Economic systems work best when they have
orderly markets. Why then would anyone want to max-
imize disorder? Similarly, economic systems work best
when there is less uncertainty. Why then would anyone
want to maximize uncertainty? The inability to resolve
this crucial issue has been a major conceptual roadblock
for decades thwarting meaningful progress, as evidenced
from Amartya Sen’s remarks about the Theil index [34] or
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Paul Samuelson’s objections to entropy in economics [35].
The crucial insight here is the recognition that en-
tropy is a measure of fairness in a distribution, an in-
sight that has not been explicitly recognized and par-
ticularly stressed in prior work in statistical thermody-
namics, information theory, or economics. Despite the
several attempts in the past, entropy has played, by and
large, only a marginal role in economics, even that with
strong objections from leading practitioners. Its piv-
otal role in economics and in free market dynamics has
never been recognized. This is mainly because entropy’s
essence as fairness appears as different facets in different
contexts [38]. In thermodynamics, being fair to all ac-
cessible phase space cells at equilibrium under the given
constraints – i.e., assigning equal probabilities to all the
allowed microstates – projects entropy as a measure of
randomness or disorder [58]. This is the appropriate in-
terpretation in this particular context, but it obscures
the essential meaning of entropy as a measure of fair-
ness. In information theory, being fair to all messages
that could potentially be transmitted in a communica-
tion channel – i.e., assigning equal probabilities to all
the messages – shows entropy as a measure of uncer-
tainty [50, 51]. Again, while this is the appropriate in-
terpretation for this application, this, too, conceals the
real nature of entropy. In the design of teleological sys-
tems, being fair to all potential operating environments,
entropy emerges as a measure of robustness i.e., maximiz-
ing system safety or minimizing risk [66]. Once again,
this is the right interpretation for this domain, but this
also hides its true meaning.
Thus, the common theme across all these different con-
texts is the essence of entropy as a measure of fairness,
which stems from the notion of equality expressed math-
ematically. If there are N possible candidates among
whom a resource is to be distributed, and if no partic-
ular candidate is to be preferred over another, then the
fairest distribution of the resource is one of equal alloca-
tion among all of them. This quantitative mathemati-
cal relationship is at the core of the concept of fairness.
Bernoulli and Laplace expressed this notion in probabil-
ity theory as the Principle of Insufficient Reason. The
generalization of this principle is the Principle of Maxi-
mum Entropy [50] which addresses the question: “What
is the fairest assignment of probabilities of several alter-
natives given a set of constraints?” Thus, the roots of
entropy as a fairness measure can be traced all the way
back to the Principle of Insufficient Reason [38]. Some-
how, this important insight seems to have been missed
in all these years since the discovery of entropy.
It is a historical accident that the concept of entropy
was discovered in the context of thermodynamics and,
therefore, unfortunately, got tainted with the negative
notions of doom and gloom, while, ironically, it is really
a measure of fairness, which is a good thing. Even its
subsequent “rediscovery” by Shannon in the context of
information theory did not help much, as entropy now
got associated with uncertainty, again not a good thing.
It is important not to confuse entropy as a concept from
physics even though it was discovered there. In other
words, it is not like energy or momentum, which are
physics-based concepts. Entropy really is a concept in
probability and statistics, an important property of dis-
tributions, whose application has been found to be useful
in physics and information theory. In this regard, it is
more like variance which is a property of distributions,
a statistical property, with applications in a wide vari-
ety of domains. However, as a result of this profound,
but understandable, confusion about entropy as a phys-
ical principle, one got trapped in the popular notions of
entropy as randomness, disorder, doom or uncertainty,
which has prevented people from seeing the deep and
intimate connection between statistical theories of inani-
mate systems composed of non-rational entities (e.g., gas
molecules in thermodynamics) and of animate, teleologi-
cal, systems of rational agents seen in biology, economics,
and sociology.
In addition, and most crucially for economics, en-
tropy’s connection with the self-organizing free market
dynamics has not been made before. Our contribution
demonstrates that the ideal free market for labor pro-
motes fairness as an emergent self-organized property and
identifies entropy as the appropriate measure of this fair-
ness. We believe that by properly recognizing entropy
as a measure of fairness, a fundamental economic and
social principle, and showing how it is naturally and in-
timately connected to the dynamics of the free market,
our theory makes a significant conceptual advance in re-
vealing the deep and direct connections between game
theory, statistical thermodynamics, information theory,
and economics.
As noted in the introduction, researchers in the
econophysics community have proposed thermodynam-
ical models for the emergence of income and wealth dis-
tributions [16, 17, 20–22, 27, 29, 65]. Even though our
contribution also utilizes concepts from statistical me-
chanics, it takes an entirely different perspective by ad-
dressing the fairness issue. The fairness question has not
been addressed in the past econophysics approaches. On
the other hand, there has been a great amount of work by
economists on fairness but these approaches have not ad-
dressed whether the free market dynamics will lead to a
fair distribution. Indeed, the conventional wisdom in eco-
nomics is that the free market for labor cares only about
efficiency and not fairness. Thus, there is a disconnect be-
tween the econophysics and mainstream economics com-
munities in this context. The former has proposed mod-
els inspired by statistical mechanical analogues but has
not interpreted entropy in economically relevant terms
– in particular, it has not addressed the issue of fair-
ness in its theories. In contrast, the latter, which has
proposed many theories of fairness, has not recognized
the relevance of, and connected with, the statistical ther-
modynamic theories. Our contribution is to identify the
deep connections between these two as well as with game
theory, thereby integrating the apparently disparate ap-
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proaches into a unified conceptual framework.
This revelation of entropy’s true meaning also sheds
new light on a decades-old fundamental question in eco-
nomics, as Samuelson [67] posed in his Nobel Lecture,
“what it is that Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ is sup-
posed to be maximizing”, or as Monderer and Shap-
ley [68] stated regarding the potential function P ∗ in
game theory, “This raises the natural question about the
economic content (or interpretation) of P ∗: What do the
firms try to jointly maximize? We do not have an answer
to this question.”
Our theory suggests that what all the agents in a free
market environment are jointly maximizing, i.e., what
the “invisible hand” is maximizing, is fairness. Maxi-
mizing entropy, or game theoretic potential, is the same
as maximizing fairness collectively in economic systems,
i.e., being fair to everyone under the given constraints. In
other words, economic equilibrium is reached when every
agent feels she or he has been fairly compensated for her
or his efforts. As we all know, fairness is a fundamental
economic principle that lies at the foundation of the free
market system. It is so vital to the proper functioning
of the markets that we have regulations and watchdog
agencies that breakup and punish unfair practices such
as monopolies, collusion, and insider trading. Thus, it
is eminently reasonable, indeed particularly reassuring,
to find that maximizing fairness collectively, i.e., maxi-
mizing entropy, is the condition for achieving economic
equilibrium. We call this result the fair market hypothe-
sis. We claim that the ideal free market, in addition to
being efficient, also promotes fairness to the maximum
level allowed by the constraints imposed on it. A related
interpretation is that the game theoretic potential cap-
tures the trade offs among utility from salary, disutility
from effort and utility from fairness, for all the agents
collectively. The ideal free market tries to accommodate
every agent’s individual preference regarding this trade
off, given the overall constraints on money and job open-
ings. Thus, in a sense, the market is trying to maximize
“harmony”, an accord freely and jointly agreed to by all
the agents, where every agent feels fairly compensated
for his effort.
A key prediction of this theory is that the lognormal
distribution is the fairest inequality of pay in organiza-
tions under ideal conditions at equilibrium, if the em-
ployee population is homogenous. For a two-class popu-
lation, we predict that the overall distribution is a com-
bination of two different lognormal distributions corre-
sponding to the two classes. In this case, as we showed,
the upper-tail (comprising of the top earners, top ∼3-
5%), though lognormal, can be fitted quite accurately as
an inverse power law or a Pareto distribution. It has
been empirically observed that the income distribution,
across different countries and different time periods, fol-
lows a lognormal distribution for the bottom ∼95% and
an inverse power law (Pareto) for the top ∼3-5%. The
empirical data supports our prediction, but we would like
to observe that the Pareto fit for the top end is a mis-
taken identity of the underlying lognormal distribution
that is different from the one that fits the bottom ∼95%.
Further studies are needed to carefully analyze the data
to settle this issue.
Typically, econophysicists [20, 21, 27] like to claim that
the bottom ∼95% follows Boltzmann-Gibbs (BG) expo-
nential distribution or a gamma distribution, not lognor-
mal, and that the top ∼3-5% follows a Pareto distribu-
tion. We beg to differ on both counts as we have shown in
this paper. One main difficulty with the BG exponential
or the gamma distribution claim is the interpretation of
the underlying economic notions. For example, from the
maximum entropy procedure which underlie these claims,
we can show that the BG exponential distribution im-
plies a utility function that is linear in salary [52] which
conflicts with the principle of diminishing marginal util-
ity, one of the founding concepts of economic theory. At
the risk of repeating ourselves, we emphasize that in our
framework we have tried to formulate an approach that is
sensible from an economic perspective – e.g., recognizing
entropy as fairness, modeling agents with reasonable util-
ity preferences, rational agents making moves motivated
by utility maximization and not due to random events,
etc.
Given that different employees in an organization have
different talents thereby making different contributions,
some more some less, we expect them to be compensated
differently. So, we naturally expect an unequal distribu-
tion of pay in an organization. This is only fair as people
who contribute more should be paid more. But how much
more? What is the fairest distribution of pay? In other
words, what is the fairest inequality of pay? This is at the
heart of the inequality debate. Our theory suggests that
the lognormal distribution is the fairest inequality of pay
for a homogenous population. One may view our result
as an ‘economic law’ in the statistical thermodynamics
sense. The ideal free market, guided by the “invisible
hand”, will self-organize to “discover” and obey this eco-
nomic law if allowed to function freely without collusion
like practices or other such unfair interferences. This re-
sult is the economic equivalent of the Gibbs-Boltzmann
exponential distribution in thermodynamics.
There are obvious limitations to our model – we have
assumed perfectly rational agents, no externalities, ideal
free market conditions, and so on, which are clearly not
valid in real life. However, our objective was to develop
a general game theoretic framework, identify key prin-
ciples, and make predictions that are not restricted by
market specific details and nuances. Nevertheless, de-
spite such simplifying assumptions, it is encouraging that
our predictions are supported by empirical data. Clearly,
the next steps are to conduct more comprehensive studies
of pay distributions in various organizations in order to
understand in greater detail the deviations from ideality
in the market place. Agencies such as the Bureau of La-
bor Statistics and National Bureau of Economic Research
could organize task forces to gather pay data from var-
ious companies and organizations. The data should be
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so grouped to analyze pay distribution patterns across
several dimensions such as: (i) organization size – small,
medium, large, and very large number of employees, (ii)
different industrial sectors, (iii) different types such as
private corporations, governments (state and federal),
non-profit organizations, etc. Similar studies should be
conducted in other countries as well so that we can better
understand global patterns.
Further work is also needed to examine whether there
are other payoff functions which can explain and predict
better than what we have proposed. Another obvious line
of research is combining this approach with behavioral
models., by endowing the ideal agents with non-idealities
such as trending and copying behaviors.
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